

EXHIBIT NO. 157

(This Exhibit consists of reports, findings, and conclusions of the Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements (See table of contents attached to this Exhibit) and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee Record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 158

(This Exhibit is a compilation of documents relating to United States-British conversations concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the following items:

1. Memorandum of conversation dated February 7, 1941 concerning the Far Eastern situation and attached aide-memoire.
2. Letter dated February 11, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to Secretary Hull with two telegrams, A and B, each dated February 11, 1941 attached.
3. Paraphrase of message dated February 15, 1941 for the President from Prime Minister Churchill.
4. Memorandum for the President dated February 22, 1941.
5. Paraphrase of telegram from the British Ambassador, Tokyo to the Foreign Office, April 13, 1941.
6. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark dated April 29, 1941 with attachments dated April 25, and 28, respectively.
7. Memorandum for the President from Secretary Knox enclosing a reply to certain U. S. proposals dated May 8, 1941 from Rear Admiral Danckwerts.
8. Memorandum of conversation dated October 17, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese relations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Halifax, with attachment dated October 16, 1941.
9. Telegram dated November 5, 1941 (5 sections) from Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State being a message for the President from Prime Minister Churchill.
10. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Halifax and Mr. Welles dated November 12, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese negotiations with attachment dated November 11, 1941.
11. Paraphrase of memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Mr. Dening of the British Embassy November 14, 1941.
12. Letter dated November 29, 1941 from the British Embassy, Washington to Secretary Hull.
13. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to Secretary Hull with enclosures dated November 30, 1941.
14. Letter dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to the President enclosing paraphrase of a report from London on the military situation delivered to the President from the British Embassy on December 8, 1941.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**DATE: February 7,
1941.file
SUBJECT:

The Far Eastern Situation

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. W. M. Butler,
Counselor of the
British Embassy,
and
Mr. Hamilton

COPIES TO:

In leaving with me the attached aide-memoire of February 7 marked "very confidential", Mr. Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, said that the Embassy had just received two telegrams from the British Foreign Office containing confidential information which the Embassy was instructed to communicate to the American Government. Mr. Butler said that the information was as follows:

The first telegram, dated February 6, was to the effect that according to reliable information the Japanese Embassy in London on February 4 received instructions to reduce to a minimum its contacts with the British and to be prepared to leave on short notice; that these instructions were disseminated at the Japanese Embassy in London; that some members of the Embassy

-4-

were dismayed by the instructions while others were not; that it was believed at the Japanese Embassy that the instructions had reference to some scheme of cooperation with Germany advocated by the Japanese military party.

The second telegram, also dated February 6, was to the effect that the notification date referred to in the first telegram was either February 9 or February 12 (the telegram as received by the British Embassy was garbled and the Embassy had not yet worked out whether the correct date was February 9 or February 12); that there was some indefinite reference to the plan in question being linked up with the Soviet Government and Chinese Communists; that the proposed action was being carefully planned so as not to appear to affect United States interests; that the movement of the United States Fleet was regarded as of a routine character; and that there was a good deal of talk at the Japanese Embassy in London about war.

Mr. Butler added that it was possible that the British Ambassador might ask to talk to the Secretary of State and to the President in regard to the information set forth in the two telegrams under reference.

FK:MMH:NES

Very Confidential.

AIDE MEMOIRE

Evidence is accumulating that the Japanese may already have decided to push on Southward even if this means war. Press reports indicate that Japan is using her position as mediator between Thailand and Indo China to gain, besides a preferential economic position, a Naval Base at Camranh Bay, Air Bases in Southern Indo-China and control of the Indo China customs. There is also reason to suppose that some military agreement with Thailand, directed against our territories and the Netherlands East Indies is under consideration.

The following are a few "straws in the wind":

(a) His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo reports a general feeling amongst the Japanese that a crisis in the Far East will come within the next few weeks.

(b) Cancellation of sailings of Japanese ships to the United States and the commandeering of ships by the Japanese Government have been reported. These reports have not so far been confirmed by the British Naval authorities in Singapore.

(c) Japan is continuing to supply munitions to Thailand. For instance, a Japanese steamer arrived at Bangkok on January 29th with the following war material for the Thai Government: 8,000 bombs, 20 tanks and 10,000 cases containing unspecified arms and ammunition.

(d) A telephone conversation was intercepted between two Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang to the effect that the Japanese attack would take place on February 10th. The Netherlands authorities attach no undue importance to the conversation but think that it cannot be disregarded.

(e) A Japanese Naval Officer recently stated to students of the Malay language that time was very short indeed.

(f) The time-table of the "Asaka Maru" which is taking a Naval Mission to Berlin and may be bringing back machinery and certain metals, seems to indicate that action is not contemplated until the middle of March.

(g) A French source in Indo China reports concentrations in Formosa and Hainan.

While none of these indications may be conclusive in themselves, their accumulative effect is to suggest that a further movement is impending. Most of this information has already been given to the United States Naval Attache in London.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C., February 7th 1941.

Secret

Copy sent to
Walter F. ...
B: THE ...
WASHINGTON, D. C.
[Handwritten signatures]

Dear Mr. ...

... in the ...

... because ...

... the ...

the ...

Mr. ...

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D C

[Faint, illegible text]

[Handwritten signature]

Substance of Telegram A Received at the
British Embassy from the Foreign Office on February 11th. 1941

The consequences of the Japanese movements in Indo-China and Thailand have been reviewed once more by the Chiefs of Staff, who have furnished an estimate of the immediate danger to be anticipated. This estimate is as follows:-

The Japanese are now engaged in a movement designed both to increase their hold on Indo-China and to obtain strategic facilities in Thailand. According to the information in the possession of the British authorities it is unlikely that the Japanese will be content with this; it is probable that they are contemplating more drastic action, the exact nature of which is as yet uncertain. The general effect of the present Japanese movement is to weaken the strategic position of the British Empire in the Far East by enabling the Japanese to secure vantage points near Singapore. If the Japanese movement were to be extended, not only would this tendency be increased but the Japanese might obtain important economic resources which would greatly strengthen their capacity to carry on a war.

It is felt certain that the Japanese are acting with the encouragement of Germany and that they are planning more vigorous aggressive measures in direct agreement with the German Government. For these measures to help Germany, they must directly

affect/

-2-

affect British interests and are therefore probably designed to force Great Britain into war with Japan. Such a war would expose to attack British communications with Australia and New Zealand, and British trade in the Far East and in the Indian Ocean, and might even jeopardize the communications between the United Kingdom and the Middle East. The efforts which the British authorities would be bound to make to prevent excessive damage to these vital interests would weaken their whole war effort against Germany. Indeed, if the threat to Singapore became imminent, the British authorities might be forced temporarily to transfer the British fleet from the Mediterranean in order to free naval forces for action in the Indian Ocean.

It will be appreciated what a profound set-back this last step would constitute. Thus war with Japan would inevitably lengthen the war with Germany and would, indeed, make ultimate British success improbable without the full participation of the United States.

Hence, while the direct danger to American interests in the Far East constituted by a further Japanese movement is clear, the indirect danger to the United States is ever more serious. Indeed, it seems evident that Japanese aggression against British interests in the Far East represents a serious threat to the safety of the United States on

account/

-3-

account of its effect on the British war effort as a whole. It is essential, therefore, in the interests not only of the British Empire but of the United States, to take steps which will prevent the Japanese from taking the plunge.

Substance of Telegram B received at the 1741
British Embassy from the Foreign Office on February 11th.

In your further talks with the United States Government you will no doubt call attention to the views of the Chiefs of Staff. The important point to emphasize is that the initiative lies with Japan. If Japan is bent on war in combination with Germany, mere attempts on our part to avoid the issue are unlikely to be successful. The only thing likely to avert war is to make it clear to Japan that further aggression will meet with the opposition both of the United States and of ourselves.

A joint declaration to the Japanese by the United States and the British Empire that any attack on the Netherlands East Indies or on the British possessions in the Far East would involve Japan in war immediately and irreparably with both the United States and the British Empire is obviously the course most likely to achieve this end. It is realised, however, that such a proposal may present certain difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned the Foreign Secretary has made it clear to the Japanese Ambassador that if British territories are attacked they will be defended with the utmost vigour. Speaking to the Japanese Ambassador on February 7th, Mr. Eden said that while His Majesty's Government had no aggressive intentions they did not intend to sacrifice the British possessions in the Far East at the dictation of any power. Nor were His Majesty's Government prepared to agree that Japan alone was entitled to control the destinies of the peoples of the Far East. Great Britain intended to

discharge/

-2-

discharge her obligations to those people in that part of the world for whom she was responsible and if British territories were attacked, the British people would undoubtedly defend them with the utmost vigour.

It would be most useful if the President, when seeing the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival, could speak to him in somewhat similar terms and make plain beyond the possibility of misunderstanding the interest of the United States in Far Eastern affairs. If a joint declaration on the lines indicated above is impracticable then it is clearly of the greatest importance that the United States Government should independently go as far as they can to make plain their attitude to the Japanese Government.

With this object in view you should seek an interview with the President and in placing before him on the most comprehensive lines our information regarding the present situation in the Far East, inform him of the line already taken by the Foreign Secretary with the Japanese Ambassador in London.

You should furthermore point out that in the view of the British authorities the situation would be greatly improved if in addition to any statement or warning that the United States Government may see fit to make to Japan, the American naval forces in the Far East were to be increased, either by sending reinforcements to Manila or despatching a detachment to Singapore. At this stage of events the most effective check upon further Japanese adventures would appear to be some definite move on the part of the American Fleet.

MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 15, 1941 FOR THE
PRESIDENT FROM MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL
(PARAPHRASE)

There are indications, from many drifting straws, that the Japanese mean to make war on us, or to do something which would compel us to make war on them, during the next few weeks or months. Personally I am not sure that this is not a war of nerves which is intended as a cover for Japanese advances in Indochina and in Siam. Nevertheless I consider that I should let you know that should the weight of the Japanese Navy be thrown against us, situations beyond the capacity of our own naval strength would confront us.

Japan would not be likely, in my opinion, to dispatch such a large military expedition as would be necessary to besiege Singapore. Doubtless they would occupy oil fields and strategic centers in the Netherlands East Indies and vicinity which they desire and in this manner acquire a much better position for a subsequent full scale onslaught against Singapore. Also they would make raids on the ports and coasts of New Zealand and Australia, thus arousing much anxiety in those countries who have already sent to the Middle East all of their best-trained men. However, I fear most of all an attack by raiders, which might include battle cruisers, against our communications and trade routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By inviting disaster elsewhere we could dispatch some powerful warships into these great expanses of ocean. But escorts would be few and far between and it would be necessary for all shipping to go into convoy. This would constitute an extremely serious additional limitation and disarrangement of our entire war economy. Moreover, it would end altogether all the military reinforcements which we had intended to develop in the Middle East from Indian and Australasian resources.

Should there be a threat of a major attack of New Zealand and Australia we would be compelled, of course, to remove our navy from the eastern Mediterranean. Such an action would result in disastrous military possibilities in that area, a certainty that some accommodation would have to be made by Turkey, and the reopening of German oil supplies and German trade from the Black Sea. Thus, Mr. President, you will see what an awful weakening of our war effort would come about; merely should Japan send her battle cruisers and her 12 cruisers carrying 8-inch guns into the eastern oceans, and still more should there be any serious invasion threat against New Zealand and Australia.

-2-

There are some who consider that in Japan's present mood she would have no hesitation to entertain an attempt to make war against both your country and mine. Although it is my personal belief that the ~~odds~~ ^{odds} are definitely against such an event, one cannot tell. Whatever you are able to do to instill in Japan anxiety as to a double war may succeed in averting this danger. Nevertheless should we alone be attacked, it would be difficult to overstate the grave character of the consequences.

*Dispatches
Hull folder*

*file
journal*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Poughkeepsie, N. Y.
February 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Renshaw in Secretary Hull's office phoned the following paraphrase of a message for the President from the Former Naval Person:

"Have received better news concerning Japan. It seems Jap Foreign Minister is shortly going to Moscow, Berlin and Rome for the purpose of covering the failure of action against us. The fear of the U. S. appears to have postponed attack which seemed imminent. While completely understanding your situation pending enactment of Bill on which our hopes depend, the more these fears can be aroused the better."

"Appreciation given in my last message to you of naval consequences subsequent to Jap attack against us remains the same in all circumstances."

The message is dated February 20, 1941.

TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR AT TOKYO TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE.
APRIL 13, 1941 (PARAPHRASE)

We have been furnished the information below by a secret source of reliability who is in touch with the Prime Minister of Japan and who has been accurate on two previous occasions, namely, (1) advance notice (3 weeks) of the military alliance in the Three-Power Treaty of September 1940, and (2) the occupation of the Island of Hainan 14 days before the event.

We learn from this source that there is now at Hainan and Formosa an expeditionary force, with transports at hand, of from 12 to 15 divisions. On the pretense of manœuvres and at a time in mid-March when the disembarkation of foreigners at Nagasaki was forbidden, a total of 8 or 10 divisions were sent to Formosa. The expeditionary force is composed of these troops plus several divisions, 3 or more, which were already in Hainan.

There is a plan for the synchronization of a direct attack on Singapore with German action in blocking the Suez Canal in order that the passage of British naval forces may be prevented. It is said that an attack on the Suez Canal of devastating force is about to be launched. It is the idea of the Japanese that if an attack on Singapore is made soon, America will not be prepared to intervene, since opinion is not united at home and the United States is pre-occupied with such matters as aid to Britain, the battle of the Atlantic and the submarine menace. However, here is a Japanese fleet at Formosa besides light naval forces which are based in the Mandates. The original plan of taking Indochina bases was abandoned since that would have warned America which might have taken action. The current plan for a direct surprise attack on Malaya in force does not entail the use of such bases. Last night, although American newspaper correspondents had a story along these lines, they were unable to send it.

File No. : 740.0011 P. W./191.

SECRET

11

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

29 April 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending by special officer messenger copy of the questions you asked us to send to the British when we were last in the White House, and also am enclosing copy of their reply.

Please note the "secret status".

Betty

Op-12-VED
 A16-1/EF13
 (Serial 5)

SECRET

11

April 25, 1941.

SECRET

My dear Admiral Danckwerts:

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has instructed me to convey to you his view that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the main report of ABC-1 ought to apply to major changes in the disposition of the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, even in advance of the time that the United States may enter the war. He proposes, therefore, to keep the British Chief of the Naval Staff informed as to all contemplated shifts of United States naval forces, and to invite the advice of that officer concerning such movements.

2. I have already informed you orally that one aircraft carrier and five destroyers are now en route from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and that the primary reason for this movement is because the U.S.S. RANGER (Atlantic Fleet) is soon to undergo an extensive navy yard overhaul.

3. However, the Chief of Naval Operations has in contemplation other changes of a more important nature. He therefore requests that you obtain the opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff as to the following:

- (a) With due regard to the existing political situation in the Far East, and to the present strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet, would it be advisable, at this time, for the United States to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic three battleships, four light cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons? (Note that this force is nearly equal to the force to be transferred after the United States enters the war.)
- (b) If Axis pressure forces the British Mediterranean Fleet to leave the Mediterranean Sea, would this Fleet remain in the Indian Ocean or Far Eastern waters? Would it be desirable at the time this British fleet retires to the eastward, for the United States simultaneously to shift strong naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Sincerely,

/s/ R.K. Turner,
 Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Rear Admiral V.H. Danckwerts, C.M.G.,
 British Embassy,
 1100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
 Washington, D.C.

Copy to:

War Plans Division, U.S. Army
 Rear Admiral C.L. ...

|| COPY ||

BRITISH EMBASSY,

Washington, D. C.

REST SECRET

28th April, 1941

My dear Admiral Turner:

I have to-day received a telegraphic reply from the British Chiefs of Staff to the contents of your letter dated April 25th, 1941 (Op-12-VED A16-1/KF13(Serial 5).)

2. The Chiefs of Staff express their gratitude for the proposals made in paragraph 1. of your letter, and ask that the Chief of Naval Operations may be informed of their full agreement with these proposals.

3. As regards the provision of reciprocal information, the Chiefs of Staff feel sure that the Chief of Naval Operations will appreciate the difficulty of providing a day to day report of all changes, but propose that a regular periodical summary of British major dispositions should be communicated by them. They suggest that it might be rendered weekly, and would be glad to know if this suggestion would be satisfactory to the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the move proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter would be advantageous. It would make more forces available for Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2, and in the event of the United States entering the war would reduce the time taken for United States' Naval forces to relieve the British force at present based on Gibraltar. The Chiefs of Staff feel satisfied that the consequential reduction in the strength of the United States' Pacific Fleet would not unduly encourage Japan.

5. As regards the question posed in paragraph 3(b) of your letter, while the Chiefs of Staff do not anticipate that any such contingency is likely at present, they state that should the circumstance arise, and the Suez Canal still be open, the Mediterranean Fleet would probably be sent into the Indian Ocean in the first place. In that event they agree that a further transference of Naval forces from the United States' Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic would be desirable.

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

-2-

6. If the Mediterranean Fleet was not able to pass direct into the Indian Ocean owing to the blocking of the Suez Canal, the Fleet would be brought into the Atlantic through the Western Mediterranean; an operation which the Chiefs of Staff consider feasible. In this event, and assuming that no other capital ship force had been sent to the Far East or Indian Ocean, a further reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet would be undesirable.

7. As regards the reference to the movement of the Mediterranean Fleet being limited to the Indian Ocean as a first stage, I believe it to be the views of the Chiefs of Staff that if Japan was a belligerent it would not be advisable to send to the Far East itself, to be based on Singapore, a naval force weaker than that put forward in ABC-1, Annex III, Page 15. Until, therefore, that strength was available it would be their intention to retain the Mediterranean Fleet (three battleships, etc.) in the Indian Ocean based probably in Trincomalee.

8. Nevertheless, I interpret their reply to mean that in their view a U.S. naval strength similar to that of the Mediterranean Fleet could be transferred into the Atlantic, in addition to those units proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter, if the Mediterranean Fleet moved into the Indian Ocean and Japan still remained a non-belligerent. It will be realised that such a further transfer to the Atlantic from the Pacific Fleet would facilitate an earlier despatch to the Far East of additional British naval forces which, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Fleet, would provide the necessary strength for satisfactory operation from Singapore in the event of Japan entering the war.

9. If the Chief of Naval Operations wishes to pursue this matter further, perhaps we might have a discussion on the subject, after which I could question the Chiefs of Staff in more detail.

Yours sincerely

V.H. Dantkewerts

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner,
U. S. Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

at
Rear Admiral.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

My Dear Mr. President: I am
attaching herewith
a formal reply to from
the Defence Committee of
the British Cabinet to
the query we put to
Adm. Danksbury on transfer
of part of the Pacific fleet
to the Atlantic.

Yours sincerely

J.K.

REPLY TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES PROPOSALS**SECRET**AIDE MEMOIRE.

Inform U.S. authorities that the issues raised by this proposal have been considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and that as such a move vitally affects Australia and New Zealand we have obtained their opinions.

2. Our opinion which is concurred in in general by both Australia and New Zealand is that any marked advance by the U.S. Navy in or into the Atlantic would be on the whole more likely to deter Japan from going to war than the maintenance of the present very large U.S. Fleet at Hawaii, and further that it might exercise a profound influence on the present critical situation in Spain, Turkey and Vichy France. You should therefore strongly encourage American action in this sense.

3. The problem for the U.S. authorities is so nicely to judge the degree of the transfer that while still retaining the deterrent effect of a strong U.S. Fleet in the Pacific, there will also be the deterrent effect of an increased U.S. Fleet in the Atlantic.

4. It is not only the strength but also the composition of the Fleet in the Pacific which will act as a deterrent, and in our view the necessary effect will not remain unless the Fleet in the Pacific consisted of not less than 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of the latter is considered of the greatest importance.

8th May, 1941:

H. Churchill
R. Admiral.

DEK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: OCTOBER 17, 1941

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR,
LORD HALIFAX

COPIES TO:

711.34

The British Ambassador called and handed me the attached copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Ambassador of Japan and himself yesterday.

The Ambassador said that he understood the difficulties of this country and Japan in finding ways and means of keeping up the appearance of not-too-strained relations between our two countries while the present government of Japan endeavors to improve public sentiment and opinion in support of the basic principles for which this Government stands and which envisage a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The Ambassador said he would communicate with his Government in order to see if it had any suggestions along this line, which would aid the Government of Japan to move in one direction on the fundamental issues involved.

FW 711.94/2387

EC/SH



1. The Japanese Ambassador asked rather mysteriously this morning for an interview with me, and came to see me this afternoon.

He began by recalling a conversation that we had had when he had first arrived in Washington as to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. In view then, as I knew, he had for some time been talking with Mr. Hull, and from those talks three principal points of difficulty had emerged.

The first point concerned the so-called "act". The Ambassador did not develop this in detail beyond saying that the United States Government wishes for a more precise definition of the Japanese attitude that they had with respect to the "act". He thought that the United States Government, regarding the "act" was in a position to act.

He then went on to say that he had prior to this been in contact with Mr. Hull, and that he had been told that the United States Government was in a position to act.

The second point, which was the only one of which he said that he was not certain, concerned the attitude of the Japanese Government with respect to the "act". He said that he had been told that the Japanese Government was in a position to act.

The third point, which was the only one of which he said that he was not certain, concerned the attitude of the Japanese Government with respect to the "act". He said that he had been told that the Japanese Government was in a position to act.

The Ambassador then said that he had been told that the Japanese Government was in a position to act. He said that he had been told that the Japanese Government was in a position to act.

711.94/2387

PS/RH

that had those who...
 point would involve the great...

But the ambassador did not articulate any other
 change of policy. ...
 ever if a general... it was...
 that the emperor's... would be...

The outbreak of a...
 reported in the...
 importance, and might be disregarded.

Everything in the Japanese...
 with the United States, and the only difference was as to the
 price that should be paid for it.

4. ...
 reverting to the Tripartite Pact, the ambassador
 said that though we might disagree, the Japanese government
 of the time had regarded adherence to it as the only policy
 that was possible for Japan to pursue, having regard to the
 evidence of what he called Anglo-American cooperation against
 Japan.

Freezing and embargo was res... not likely to
 effect very seriously the ordinary Japanese...
 who were accustomed to low standards, but would create
 difficulty for Japanese business, which was pressing, that
 some way out must be found.

5. I said that nobody wanted to strangle Japan, either
 here or in the British Commonwealth, provided Japanese policy
 was no longer such as to constitute a threat. However, if
 he would allow me to say so, Japanese economic difficulties
 were of her own making, and certainly should not get out

3.

of the difficulties largely created by one war by planning into another.

Both the United States and Great Britain wanted to see peace preserved in the Pacific, and there was no reason why peace should not be maintained if the Japanese Government abandoned its expansionist policy, and were willing to recognize principles which both the United States and Great Britain wished to see maintained.

But do not let the Japanese Government make the mistake of backing the wrong horse. I could well understand that many people in Japan might be misled by the succession of a parent's own victories, but let them remember that none of these victories had yet brought Germany within sight of the only victory that would win the war.

It might indeed well be argued that they had largely aggravated Germany's difficulties, and that the strain that they would impose would end by becoming intolerable.

The Ambassador said that many in Japan agreed with this view, and that he himself was of opinion that the victory of the victories were not the same thing as a war.

Returning to his main point, he asked me whether I thought that it would be possible to find any middle ground in the Pacific that might be of value in giving the way for the settlement of the relations of the United States to the point to which he had referred at the outset of our conversation, which he thought it would be extremely difficult for any new Government to solve quickly.

We knew how close the relations of the United States Government and the United States Government were, and hoped that it would be an opportunity of speaking with the United States about it. This would be a very important point.

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18th October, 1941

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

-2- 5257, November 3, 1941. (SECTION ONE) From London.

assistance will not be available in itself, but it will have the effect of making it more difficult to track down the truth.

Four. The Chinese have been told that they should not be too friendly to the United States. It is said that the Chinese are being told that the United States is not to be trusted. It is also said that the Chinese are being told that the United States is not to be trusted. It is also said that the Chinese are being told that the United States is not to be trusted.

Five. It is said that the Japanese are being told that the United States is not to be trusted. It is also said that the Japanese are being told that the United States is not to be trusted. It is also said that the Japanese are being told that the United States is not to be trusted.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO: Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.
FROM: Mr. [Name], [City], [State], U.S.A.
[Subject line]

TRIPLE PRIORITY

URGENT, [Date], [Time] (Priority)
[Main body of the telegram text, including the word 'Indochina']
[Closing text]

Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.

Faint, illegible text, possibly a signature or stamp.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

LET

This telegram must be
 closely paraphrased by
 from being communicated
 to anyone. (R)

London

Dated November 5, 1941

Rec'd. 3:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,
 Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

5957, November 5, 5 p.m., (SECTION THREE)

and more, the people of the Chinese empire and
 people will be shaken to its foundations. Our
 people has stood for more than four years on the
 eastern fronts, where the bulk of our friend's combat
 directly reaches. It would be gravely affected by
 a Japanese triumph on the sea front where, as all
 now, the armed forces of our friends are at hand.
 For the first time in our long war, a real collection
 of assistance would be possible. For more than four
 years now, China has kept more five million men in
 the field, and thus immobilized the sea power of
 Japan. The implications of this must be clear to
 you, indeed I think they are already recognized by
 yourself and all other friends of China. If Kiangsu
 fell Japan would be able to cast all her power away
 and turn her whole might seaward. The eastern
 battle is therefore not merely a question of the
 victory or defeat of China; the peace and security
 of the

-2- 5257, November 5, 5 p.m., (SECTION THREE) from
London.

of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the whole war may hang upon it. If China had the air force she needs I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of my ability to defeat the invaders. But I have nothing that I can call an air force to pit against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon me, for we may be sure that they will use their fine (though undecipherable) and their strongest. If however in this battle Japan's air force can be checked or even smothered, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprises will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain superior, but with that one can do little without strength in the air, without which there may be no hope of her recovery of expansion.

WHAAT

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be
carefully paraphrased by
those being communicated
to. (B)

London
Dated November 1, 1918
No. 445

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

107, November 1, 1918. (SECTION FOUR)

From telegram of the British Air Force...
...by political and economic...
...therefore take the...
...question...
...in this war...
...one by one...
...war upon Japan...
...question...
...the situation...
...I...
...tell you...
...The American...
...but very...
...British...
...into...
...United...
...air force,

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO DIRECTOR, FBI FROM [illegible] (S) [illegible]

SECRET

EMERGENCY

[Extremely faint and illegible teletype text, possibly containing a list or detailed report]

-3- 11:57, November 7, 5 p.m. From London

If the Japanese had known of the attack on Pearl Harbor, they would have been able to prevent it. The Japanese had been warned by the British and the United States that they were planning to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had been warned by the British and the United States that they were planning to attack Pearl Harbor. The Japanese had been warned by the British and the United States that they were planning to attack Pearl Harbor.

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~~SECRET~~
FE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE:
November 12, 1941

SUBJECT: United States-Japanese negotiations

PARTICIPANTS: British Ambassador, Viscount Halifax;
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: S, PA/D, Eu, PA/H, FE

Division of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
Department of State

ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP
NOV 12 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FN 711.34/2040-C/25

The British Ambassador called this morning at his request.

The Ambassador read to me a memorandum (the text of which is attached herewith) reporting on a recent conversation between the British Ambassador in Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told the Ambassador that, as the Secretary of State had frequently pointed out to the Japanese Government, the British Government would be informed fully of the basis for any projected negotiations between Japan and the United States if the present conversations now in progress gave any definite promise that such negotiations could be undertaken. I communicated to the Ambassador, in

711-14

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21

At a recent interview in Tokyo the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs told His Majesty's Ambassador that negotiations with the United States had now been proceeding since last April, and that his experience in such matters made him pessimistic about the outcome of so dilatory a process. In the Privy Council impatience was now taking the place of the hopes originally placed in the discussions, and it was therefore highly desirable to discover some way out before feeling became too exacerbated. Matters were being discussed which were of the utmost concern to British interests and Mr. Tojo said he was therefore somewhat surprised that His Majesty's Government were taking no part in the discussions. While he could understand that in the early stages we might prefer to leave matters in the hands of the United States Government, a point had now been reached where a breakdown might have repercussions upon British interests. The Minister said he had a strong impression that, for reasons best known to themselves, the United States Government were deliberately dragging out the negotiations. If this were so it would of course be impossible for the Japanese Government to continue them.

Speaking for himself, Sir Robert Craigie told the Japanese Foreign Minister that he felt sure that there had been no desire in any quarter deliberately to drag out the negotiations. But as he understood the position, the United States Government had been unable to elicit sufficiently definite assurances and undertakings in regard to Japan's
future/

99/0-0-0-111

-2-

future intentions, and this might lead to a hitch. The objective under discussion was an ambitious one - namely, the settlement of the situation as a whole - and it was obvious that a task of this magnitude would require time as well as patience on both sides. As regards the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the negotiations, Sir Robert Craigho suggested that it was one of helpful expectancy, and that while the Foreign Secretary was desirous of seeing a settlement reached which would be just to all the parties concerned, he was equally anxious not to intervene in any manner likely to hamper the discussions between the United States and Japan.

Upon receipt of the above report of his interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sir Robert Craigho was instructed to speak to him as follows.

Although His Majesty's Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taking place, they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government towards a general settlement in the Far East. The British Government believe such a settlement to be in their own best interests, as well as those of Japan and it is their earnest desire that it should be achieved. It cannot be expected however that all the living should be in the military line, and no advantage is seen in entering upon negotiations unless some basis

for/

-3-

for discussion can be agreed upon in advance which establishes principles upon which agreement will be sought. The British Government have been content to leave this part of the proceedings in the hands of the United States Government who are well aware of the British position. Moreover the United States Government have assured the British Government (and it is believed that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that should actual negotiations become possible the British Government will at once be consulted. At that point the British Government will be very ready to collaborate with the United States and Japanese Governments in seeking a solution of their joint problems.

Sir R. Craigie was further authorised, at his own discretion, to urge upon the Japanese Government the advantage of a supreme effort to reach agreement with the United States, as against the desperate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop in which it might no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.,

November 11th, 1941.

MEMORANDUM HANDED TO MR. HORNBECK BY MR. DENING OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY
NOVEMBER 14, 1941 (PARAPHRASE)

It may be of interest to the Department of State to have the following indications as to the possibility of an attack on Thailand by the Japanese. According to a report by the British Ambassador to Japan, there are several factors which indicates that early in 1942 is the most likely time for action against Thailand unless other factors result in precipitation of the crisis earlier.

It is stated by the British representative at Bangkok that there is no rain in Thailand from approximately mid-November until May and thus the dry weather lasts from December through April. He also reports that in the flat country, that is, Central Thailand and Cambodia, during the dry season the earth in the rice fields is baked hard. He was informed that at that time it is not difficult to improvise airdromes for temporary use, and suggests that if an attack on Thailand is contemplated by the Japanese, the beginning of 1942 may well be the best time for it.

Information has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, that there are at present about 30,000 Japanese troops in Cochin-China and Cambodia and that one and perhaps two tank regiments are included among these. Large quantities of anti-aircraft guns, motor transport and other transportation material have been imported, including small vessels which could be used for transport as far as the new boundary, situated in the northern end of Tonla Saide Lake. It is known that there are a number of air fields in the North which have either asphalt or concrete runways and which can be used at any time of the year. There are in the South metal runways at Tourane, Penon, Penh and Angkor, as well as an asphalt runway at Tan Son Nhut. Work is proceeding rapidly on the construction of runways at other fields in the South, at which heavy bombers will be used.

File No. : 740.0011 P. W./1465.

Documents requested by
the British Minister were
forwarded by Mr. Mellis
on Dec 9, 1941 to the
British Ambassador
75: 448

✓ DCR
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
file

SECRETARY OF STATE
DEC. 3 - 1941
NOTED

29th November, 1941.

R. Campbell

Dear Mr. Hull,

When I got back to the Embassy this morning
I found a telegram from Eden asking whether it would be
possible to let him see the text of the document given
to the Japanese.

711.94

I have already told him of its general
character as you described it to me, but I have no
doubt, if you have no objection, he would be grateful
for the opportunity of seeing the text.

711.301-2073

Yours very sincerely,

(for the Ambassador)

R. Campbell

The Honorable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State to the United States.

20100

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D C

7-C. CC 11 PACIFIC WAR/67C

PS/ATB

Confidential File

141

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, possibly a memorandum or report]

Harifex

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The Honorable Earl Russell,
Secretary of State for the United States.

It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the question of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our treaty of non-aggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know therefore that we have given careful consideration to this point.

2. In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the grant of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty. Similarly (although we have as yet made no communication to the Thai Government) we should not feel we could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering Thailand if a Japanese invasion occurred or was clearly impending. But it would be greatly preferable if in these eventualities we could act in co-operation with the Thai Government. If therefore it were decided to undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best to secure Thai consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the Thai Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of leakage to the Japanese.

30.11.41.

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 8th, 1941.

Secret.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein copies of
the latest report received from London
on the military situation.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

PARAPHRASE OF A REPORT FROM LONDON ON THE MILITARY SITUATION DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY ON 8TH DECEMBER

The information provided is based on reports received up to 7 a. m., 7th December, 1941.

(I) NAVAL REPORTS:

Air reconnaissance reported at 3:15 a. m. 6th December, 2 Japanese convoys of 25 and 10 ships (respectively), escorted by cruisers and destroyers, by Point Cambo (Cochin China) on a course of 270 degrees West. Contact has been lost and there is no further news at present. The armed boarding vessel mentioned in yesterday's summary was sunk by torpedo aircraft. She had on board 300 British wounded and 100 prisoners of war. 201 persons were rescued. A small British merchant vessel was sunk off Cromer last night, it is thought by a mine.

(II) MILITARY REPORTS:

LIBYA. 6th December. We maintained pressure with our mobile columns on the whole front Bardia-El Adem and also on the enemy lines of communication behind. Latest reports indicate that the enemy has concentrated his forces South of El Adem and is moving South-East towards El Gobi which is held by our troops.

RUSSIA. German pressure on Moscow continues.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS:

6th December. Spitfires damaged seriously storage systems and buildings at two alcoholic distilleries in the Cherbourg Peninsula. Our aircraft also attacked similar targets in the Dunkirk area. Off the Norwegian coast a Hudson claimed hits on a 7,500 ton merchant vessel and Beauforts probable hits on a 4,000 ton merchant vessel and a 5,000 ton tanker.

LIBYA. Nothing further to my previous report.

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN. 5-6th December. 20 Wellingtons attacked Naples for five hours. Over 25½ tons of bombs were dropped, two 4,000 pounders starting a large fire in the torpedo factory, while other bombs fell on the arsenal, air frame works, and the railway. We lost one aircraft.

(IV) G. A. F. 6th December.

A German bomber was destroyed by our fighters South of Plymouth.

MALTA. 5-6th December. Some 20 bombers approached the island during a period of nine hours. Only 8 crossed the coast and caused some damage.

(V) AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES:

In operations over and from the British Isles—German 1.

(VI) 6th December.

The transfer from the Baltic States to Finland of broad gauge locomotives and rolling stock, including tank wagons, will help to relieve the transport situation and assist German economic exploitation. This confirms reports that the whole railway system in the Baltic States is in the process of being converted to standard gauge and also the opinion that Germany intends to convert the gauge of all railways in occupied Russia.

(VII)

Both empty and full oil trains from and to Italy have regular military escorts on the Rumanian-Hungarian section of the route which indicates the degree of unrest in Hungary and Rumania.

FURTHER REPORT 7th DECEMBER, 1941

Report received at 17:40 G. M. T. today from the Commander-in-Chief in China that the Japanese were attempting to land from 5 ships at Kota Bharu on the East coast of Malaya, immediately South of the Siam Malaya frontier.